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On 10 May 1962, a package containing plaintiffs' jewelry was delivered
to defendant, Pan American Airways, Inc., for transportation from New
York to Sussex, England. Under a contract of carriage contained in an air
waybill, the package was transported to the carrier's office in London,
where it was stolen by one of the employees of the carrier. Plaintiffs en-
tered a claim in the amount of £1194 13s. 8d. (approximately $3350) for
loss of the jewelry. Defendants denied liability, but further contended that,
even if liability existed, it would be limited to £19 2s. IOd. (approximately
$53) because of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention,' a treaty for the
regulation of international air carriage, enacted into British law by the
Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act of 1932.' Plaintiff countered by
contending that, according to Article 9 of that Convention,' failure to in-
clude the particulars of volume or dimensions of the goods in the air way-
bill, as stipulated by Article 8,4 deprived defendants of the benefits of
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Warsaw, 12 Oct. 1929. Hereinafter referred to as the Convention.
aThe Carriage by Air Act, 1932, in Schedule I to that Act, contains the English translation of
the Warsaw Convention, the original text being in French. Article 22(2) of the Carriage by Air
Act, 1932, reads as follows:
In the carriage of registered luggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier is
limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the
time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the
value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that
case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless
he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 was amended in 1955 by the Hague Protocol (Protocol to Amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
Warsaw, 12 October 1929). The Hague Protocol was enacted into English law by The Carriage
by Air Act, 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz. 2c. 27), which Act is actually the Warsaw Convention as amended
at the Hague, 1955. The United States has never accepted the Hague Protocol, and hence the
Protocol does not apply to the carriage between the United States and England. Therefore, reference
is made in this case to the original Warsaw Convention, e.g., the Carriage by Air Act, 1932.
'Article 9 of the Convention (Carriage by Air Act, 1932) declares:
If the carrier accepts goods without an air consignment note having been made out,
or if the air consignment note does not contain all the particulars set out in Article
8 (a) to (i) inclusive and (q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability.
"Article 8 of the Convention (Carriage by Air Act, 1932) states in part:
The air consignment note shall contain the following particulars:-
(c) The agreed stopping places . . .
(g) The nature of the goods;
(h) The number of the packages, the method of packing and the particular marks
or humbers upon them;
(i) The weight, the quantity and the volume or dimensions of the goods;
(q) A statement that the. carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this Convention.
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limitation of liability for loss of the cargo, as conferred by Article 22.'
Trial of this preliminary issue was ordered.'
The trial court recognized that in both sections (h) and (i) of Article
8, the meaning of the original French text of the Convention was am-
biguous.7 It then pointed out that the ambiguity in section (h) had been
almost universally resolved by a conjunctive approach (so as to require
inclusion in the air waybill of 3 of the 4 particulars of "the number of the
packages, the method of packing and the particular marks or numbers upon
them") rather than a disjunctive approach (which would require that only
1 of the 4 particulars be specified). The trial court also stated that Par-
liament had apparently resolved the similar ambiguity of section (i) in the
same way via the English translation of the Convention, as contained in
the Carriage by Air Act of 1932. Therefore, the trial court held that,
according to this conjunctive approach, the defendants were not entitled
to limit their liability where the particulars of volume and dimensions of
the cargo were omitted from the air waybill.
Held, reversed: Parliament intended to give effect to the French text of
the Convention. Accordingly, any inconsistencies between the English and
French texts should be resolved by reference to the French. As the mean-
ing of the French text was ambiguous, it should be interpreted with refer-
ence to present commercial practices. Therefore, the sender should give the
weight of the goods where appropriate; however, he need not give the
volume or dimensions unless it would be necessary or useful to do so.
Accordingly, the defendants were not deprived of limitation of liability
because of failure to include in the air waybill the particulars of volume
and domensions. Corocraft, Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc. [1968]
2 L1.L.Rpt. 459, 2 All E.R. 1059.
This Note will use Corocraft as an aid in contrasting the approach of the
judiciary in its interpretation of the Warsaw Convention in cases involving
carrier liability for damage to or loss of property transported with its
intepretation of the Convention in cases dealing with carrier liability for
injury to or death of passengers.
5 Note 2, supra.
6Article 36 of the Convention (Carriage by Air Act, 1932) states:
The Convention is drawn up in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the
archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland ....
Article 8 of the original French text of the Convention reads in part as follows:
La lettre de transport a~rien droit contenir les mentions suivantes:
(c) les arrets privus, sous riserve de la faculte, pour le transporteur, de stipuler
qu'il pourra les modifier in cas de nieessiti et sans que cette modification puisse faire
perdre au transport son caractire international;
(g) 1a nature de la marchandise;
(h) le nombre, le mode d'emballage, les marques particulieres ou les numb numdros
des colis;
(i) le poids, la quantit6, le volume ou les dimensions de la marchandise;
(q) l'indication que le transport est soumis au regime de la responsabilite itabli par
la prisente Convention.
This may be compared with the corresponding English translation in Schedule I to the Carriage
by Air Act, 1932, note 4, supra.
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I. WARSAW CONVENTION-OVERVIEW
The Warsaw Convention, drafted in 1929, was concerned primarily with
protecting and assisting the fledgling international air transport industry,
which, at that time, was in its infancy.8 Limitation of carrier liability was
provided to shield the young airlines from financial insolvency which could
easily result from litigation following an air disaster causing substantial
injury or loss of life. Also, a pattern intended to standardize air transport
documentation was provided for the purpose of promoting international
uniformity. The benefits to the public were envisioned as being the creation
of a more definite basis for recovery by passengers and shippers, which
would tend to lessen litigation. Moreover, a clearer and more equitable
basis upon which carriers would obtain insurance would in turn lower
operating expenses, and thus reduce transportation charges.!
A. Passenger Carriage
The greater part of judicial activity and professional concern with the
Warsaw Convention has centered around the limitations of liability for
passenger injury or death, as set out in Article 3 of the Convention.10
Interest increased after World War II when it became apparent that the
limits of recovery were inadequate in relation to the standards of living
in the western world." The need for increased liability had promptly ex-
ceeded the ever lessening need to protect the growing international air
transport industry. As a result, the courts, particularly in the United States,
where criticism of the limits of recovery has become acutely caustic from
those enunciating the plaintiffs' position, became prone to find that the
carrier, by failure to adhere strictly to a provision of the Convention, had
lost the benefits of limitation of liability.
12
To alleviate this concern, some action was taken to raise the limits of
liability by the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention, signed in
September, 1955.1' This agreement increased the limits of liability for
passenger injury or death from the original of $8,300 (approximately) to
$16,600 (approximately). Even though the limits were doubled, the
United States refused to ratify the Protocol. Congress considered these new
limits to be still grossly inadequate. Further mounting criticism led to a
a For a more complete description of the history of the Warsaw Convention and subsequent
related agreements, see BILLYOu, AIR LAW, 2d ed. (N.Y. 1964); SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT,
AIR LAW, 3d ed. (1969); Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
SKnauth, Some Notes on the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J. AIR L. 44 (1947); Parker,
The Adequacy of the Passenger Liability Limits of the Warsaw Convention of 1929, 14 J. AIR
L. 37 (1947); Wetter, Possible Simplification of the Warsaw Convention Liability Rules, 15 J.
AIR L. 1 (1948); Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to Increase the Warsaw Convention Limit of
Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. 53 (1949); Hyman, Inadequacy of Liability Limits Under the
Warsaw Convention, 52 INs. L.J. 533; S. Doc. ExEc. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 1934 U.S.
Av. Rep. 240-44.50 See Note, 35 J. AiR L. & COM. 123 (1969); Note, 33 J. AnR L. & COM. 698 (1967);
Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291 (1965).
11 See Hyman, supra note 10.
1 See supra note 10.
13 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification -of Certain Rules Relating to" Inter-
national Carriage by Air, The Hague, 28 Sept. 1955.
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decision by the United States to withdraw its adherence to the Conven-
tion." This resulted in the Montreal Agreement,'5 which raised the limits to
$75,000. The United States then withdrew its withdrawal." During the
period leading up to Montreal, an interesting movement was afoot to
require all United States carriers coming under the Convention to pro-
vide insurance coverage of $50,000 per passenger in addition to the
amounts recoverable under tht Convention. At present, the continued
status of the Convention as a workable international agreement is un-
certain. The least that can be said is that it will probably require moderni-
zation in the future in order to maintain its prominent position in inter-
national air transport regulation. 0
B. CARGO CARRIAGE CONTRASTED
Under the Convention there has been less activity and interest in claims
arising out of loss of or damage to cargo or baggage than in the above men-
tioned area of passenger liability. One reason for this difference is that
society places a much higher value on human life and limb than on prop-
erty, and the loss of an aircraft focuses attention more sharply on the
passengers aboard than on baggage and cargo.
In the various methods of transporting cargo, whether by commercial
carrier or by the postal system, it has been the custom to insure the goods
shipped against loss or damage by merely declaring a value and paying a
small supplementary sum. This effectively makes the carrier an insurer of
the cargo to the value so declared, and tends to obviate the need for much
litigation. The Warsaw Convention incorporated this method of ordinary
business practice by Article 22 (2),'" and the limitation of liability feature,
in the absence of such a declaration of value and payment of a supplemen-
tary sum, was neither surprising nor new to the public at large. Therefore,
the purpose of this aspect of the Convention is apparently standardization
of documentation rather than limitation of liability, for this latter feature
already existed in usual commercial practice in an easily circumventable
form.
With reference to passengers, however, limitation of liability for their
safety has not been the ordinary practice in general public transportation.
Generally, public carriers have been held to a very high duty of care for
passenger safety." The ordinary, unaware citizen would not expect a differ-
ent set of rules merely because he happened to be on an international flight.
Many such passengers evidently do not even bother to read the reverse side
of a ticket, whether the Warsaw warnings be set out in a verbosity of
"Lilliputian print" or presented boldly in 10 point type."
11DEP'T OF STATE PRESS RELEASE No. 268 (15 Nov. 1965).
"CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD ORDER No. E-23,680, 13 May 1966.
'
0 DE"'T OF STATE PRESS RELEASE No. 111 (14 May 1966).
1€ See Billyou, supra note 8, at 129-31; LOWENFELD AND MENDELSOHN, supra note 8, at 533
et seq.
'
8 See note, 35 J. Asp L. & CoM. 123 (1969).
'
9 Article 22(2) of the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, note 2, supra.
" See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 3d ed. (1964), at 183-84, and cases cited therein.
" See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,-370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), where the airline lost
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Hence, litigation following Warsaw passenger injury or death cases, is
far more abundant than for property damage and loss, as the lack of hidden
surprises concerning limitations in the Convention in cargo handling
creates little more than an ordinary amount of judicial controversy.
III. WARSAW CONVENTION CARGO AND BAGGAGE CASES
Even though the United States courts are becoming ever more hostile to
the Convention as it limits carrier liability for passenger harm, they have,
nevertheless, refrained from enlarging the sphere of this hostility to those
sections of the Convention pertaining to baggage and cargo. Thus, the
English and American courts have approached baggage and cargo cases in
much the same manner. So long as the documents referring to the items in
question have been reasonably true to Convention-stipulated form, the
courts appear to have leaned neither one way nor the other in interpreting
the Convention. To the contrary, they have sought to apply the treaty
whenever possible, but in the light of practical construction.
A doctrine of reasonable interpretation of the Convention's provisions
in cargo cases was established in 1954 by the American Smelting case."
There a New York Supreme Court held that omission from the air waybill
of the agreed stopping places (such information being required by Article
8 (c) of the Convention' would not deprive the carrier of limitation of
liability where the international character of the flight was clearly indicated
by the places of departure and destination included in the air waybill. In
reaching its decision the court stated:
It is the plaintiff's contention . . . that exact compliance with article 8 is
mandatory and defendant's failure to adhere thereto in every respect prevents
the air carrier from availing itself of any of the other provisions which limit
or exclude liabilty for safe carriage. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention,
however, it is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that
they be construed so as to carry out their obvious purposes. 4
The court in American Smelting also pointed out a fact which is likewise
apparent in Corocraft:
[The] plaintiff.., could readily have eliminated any risk by paying a supple-
mentary fee for the flight and then designating on the air waybill its request
for insurance up to one hundred per cent of the declared value of the cargo.
(Warsaw Convention, article 22, subdiv. 2). Plaintiff did not request this
protection and thereby must be deemed to have assumed the complete risk of
the flight .... [A] judgment in [the plaintiff's] favor would, in effect, hold
defendant liable as an insurer of the full value of the shipment, even though
defendant was paid only the usual cargo rate."a
its limitation of liability under the Warsaw Convention because the required warning of the appli-
cability of the Warsaw limitations was printed on the passenger's ticket in very small print so as
not to give adequate notice.
22American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., I N.Y.2d 866, aff'd, 141
N.Y.S.2d 818 (1955), 136 N.E.2d 14 (1956).
"' See supra note 4.
'American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., I N.Y.2d 866, aff'd, 141
N.Y.S.2d 818 (1955), 136 N.E.2d 14 (1956).
25 Id. at 15.
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American Smelting, then, may be considered to buttress the standing of
the Convention, as does Corocraft, in the area of cargo carriage by giving it
an interpretation in consonance with accepted business practice. A similar
holding to American Smelting is that of Kraus v. KLM," a 1949 case.
There, sufficient compliance with the "agreed stopping places" requirement
of Article 8 (c) was found where the air waybill merely made reference
to the air carrier's time-tables.
It is appropriate at this point to contrast the American Smelting, Kraus,
and Corocraft holdings, concerning cargo, with a decision of 1966 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Reree Italiane" Lisi involved personal injuries resulting from the
crash of an Alitilia aircraft while en route from Rome to New York. There
the court held that Alitalia's liaiblity was not limited by the Convention,
because, even though literal compliance to Article 3 (-)' was found in a
statement printed on the ticket informing the ticket holder of the Warsaw
limitations of personal liability, notice via the ticket was insufficient in that
the printing was too small to be easily read. This holding, erosive of the
Convention's rigidity, seems to have been responded to, however, by the
Montreal Agreement provision requiring the Warsaw warnings to be set
out clearly in 10 point type," thereby apparently eliminating further
weakening interpretation on this point at the hands of the United States
judiciary. Thus, it can be seen that the courts of the United States are
drawing a sharp contrast between loss of life and loss of property.
There are, of course, cases in the Warsaw "property area" which defeat
the carrier's reliance on liability limitation. An examination of some of
these cases reveals no strongly liberal construction of the Convention to
attain a desired result. The court in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United
States " declared that where the carrier failed to deliver to the shipper a
proper air waybill, but relied instead on a charter agreement between the
22 Av. Cas. 15,017 (1949).
2' Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Ilaliane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
2' Article 3 of the Convention states:
(1) In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered containing:
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory of a
single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed stopping places being
within the territory of another State, an indication of at least one such
stopping place;
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate
destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs
and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal
injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage.
(2) The passenger ticket shall constitute Prima facie evidence of the conclusion
and conditions of the contract of carriage. The absence, irregularity or loss of the
passenger ticket does not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of car-
riage which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Convention. Never-
theless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the passenger embarks without a passenger
ticket having been delivered, or if the ticket does not include the notice required by
paragraph (1) (c) of this Article, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the provisions of Article 22.
29 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, Agreement CAB 18990, approved by order E-23,680, May 13, 1966 (docket 17325).
30 170 F. Supp. 422 (U.S. Ct. C1. 1959).
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shipper and the carrier, the carrier then lost the benefits of limitation of
liability for loss of cargo, even though the charter agreement included a
statement providing that liability of the carrier with respect to interna-
tional transportation would be subject to the rules of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The court held that the charter agreement was insufficient to comply
with the requirement that an air waybill be delivered containing a state-
ment that the provisions pertaining to limitation of liability apply to the
carriage of goods. This case, therefore, makes it clear that Warsaw compels
the use of the standard form of documentation set out in Article 8.
Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.1 allowed a shipper to recover against
the carrier in excess of the Warsaw limitations where the shipper had fol-
lowed the carrier's instructions not to declare a special value for the cargo
to a subsequently connecting carrier, and the connecting carrier lost the
shipment. This exception to the normal operation of the Convention was
based solely upon the shipper's literal compliance with the carrier's terms
(which were in contravention to the Convention), and does not of itself
connote any aggressiveness of the court towards the Convention.
A 1969 New York Supreme Court decision, Stolk v. Compagnie Na-
tionale Air France,2 would appear, at first glance, to be antagonistic to the
provisions of the Convention relating to baggage, in that the liability limi-
tation warning was set out properly in 10 point type (as per the Montreal
Agreement). Although there was proper notice of limitation of liability for
passenger safety, however, there was no such corresponding notice relating
to baggage. The court stated, concerning this point:
Thus the plaintiff was neither alerted to the need to purchase baggage insur-
ance nor appraised of the necessity to declare excess value in order to protect
her property .... the concurrent absence of any equally clear, legible state-
ment regarding the limits of liability for loss of baggage might readily tend
to create a strong impression in the mind of a passenger that there are no
limitations for baggage loss."
The court recognized this treaty as the "supreme law of the land,""4 and
indicated its intention to put the Convention into full effect by the follow-
ing statement:
Were the courts to adopt defendant's position, the requirement of the conven-
tion to give adequate notice of the defendant's potential limits of liability
would be completely negated. Such a result would not only be unjust for the
reasons above noted, but would supercede, by judicial fiat, a treaty of the
United States. This court may not so rule.'
Thus the Stolk case, as well, offers no indication of an antithetical approach
of the courts to the Convention in relation to cargo and baggage, but
rather a conclusion predictable from the overall meaning of the Conven-
tion itself.
"' 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 79 S.Ct. 230, 79 S.Ct. 235.
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Another case, Seth v. BOAC,' almost, by comparison, seems to favor the
carrier. In that case the plaintiff had packed a valuable manuscript in one
of his pieces of checked baggage, but declared no special value. Upon
arriving in London, the baggage was not found. Up to this point, the
plaintiff's passenger ticket and baggage check properly indicated two pieces
of checked baggage. He continue his journey to the United States with the
carrier's assurance that his baggage would be forwarded, but his ticket for
this last part of the passage contained no indication of "number and weight
of the pacages," as required by Article 4 (3) (f) of the Convention."7 The
court held that, inspite of this deficiency, the ticket and baggage check
complied, nevertheless, with the Convention because the plaintiff had
"failed to show that there had been any baggage on the last stage of the
journey."3 The plaintiff, therefore, was awarded recovery only to the
limits imposed by the Convention." The Seth case resembles Corocraft
closely in that the plaintiff had at his disposal a means of recovery in the
event of loss at a small cost-declaration of a higher value and payment of
a supplementary fee.
IV. COROCRAFT: A DEEPER LooK
The Court of Appeals in Corocraft, in arriving at its application of the
Convention, was explicit in rejecting the plaintiffs' reliance upon, and the
trial court's following of, the English text of the Warsaw Convention.
The court noted that it was the intention of the Carriage by Air Act of
1932 to put the Warsaw Convention into effect in English law rather than
the act itself. The first section of the Act states that:
329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1964).
7 Article 4(3) (f) of the Convention (28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (a), 49 Stat. 3015, 3019, 3021)
provides:
(1) For the transportation of baggage other than small personal objects of which
the passenger takes charge himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
.S"pr note 36, at 302.
a9 Article 22 of the Convention (49 Stat. 3000) contains provisions for limitation of liability:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passen-
ger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form
of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the
carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor
has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special
declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so
requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor
at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc con-
sisting of 65 2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thou-
sandths. These sums may be converted into any national currency in round figures.
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
[T]he provisions thereof [of the Convention] as set out in the First Schedule
of this Act shall . . . have the force of law in the United Kingdom. . .. '
Turning to Article 36 of the First Schedule one finds the following state-
ment:
The Convention is drawn up in French in a single copy which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Poland.
Therefore, insofar as the English text in the First Schedule of the Act
is not an exact translation of the original French text, reference to it by
the Act of 1932 should be rejected (false demonstration non nocet), and
reference to the French text persued.
As the French text is unclear and ambiguous as to the actual intention
of section (i), the court found itself free to follow the sound and effective
remedial approach of the English Common Law by evaluating the overall
intention of the Convention in relation to the common business practices
of the particular trade or industry involved.' It was noted that the airlines
generally did not require the particulars of volume or dimensions, as the
primary measure of freight charges stems from the weight of the cargo,
and that these otherwise superfluous items should be included only where
they are relevant or useful (as, for example, an item of cumbersome or
unusual geometry, or an item of substantial volume and little weight).
Accordingly, the court found that the air waybill in Corocraft did conform
to the proper interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention, and therefore,
the defendants were entitled to the limitation of liability provided by
Article 22.
It was significantly noted that the plaintiffs in Corocraft had made no
declaration of value of the contents of the package to the defendants, and
had not paid the additional sum provided for by Article 22. In fact, the
plaintiffs had indicated on the air waybill in the space provided for value
declaration "NVD," meaning "NO VALUE DECLARED." In an adjacent
space provided for declaration of value for customs purposes they had
placed "2959.00" to indicate the value in American dollars. It becomes
clearly apparent that the plaintiffs fully intended not to take advantage of
the ease with which they could effectively insure their cargo with the air-
line, and it must be assumed that they were aware of the consequences.
In supporting its holding, the court noted that the plaintiffs could have
brought their action in the United States, where the decision would have
been in favor of the defendant,' and that there should be consistency
between the holdings of the two countries. Referring to a previous deci-
sion of the Queen's Bench, Samuel Montagu & Co., Ltd. v. Swiss Air Trans-
port Company, Ltd.,44 the court stated (concerning Article 8 (q) 4) that
40Corocraft, Ltd., and Vendome Jewels, Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., [1968] 2 LI.




442 Q.B. 306, 1 Lloyd's Rpt. 323 (1966).
45See supra note 4.
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the court held that it should not be given a rigid interpretation such as would
hamper the conduct of business: but should be read as if it contained the
qualification "so far as applicable to the carriage.""
The court also referred to the American Smelting case" and noted that a
liberal interpretation there of Article 8 (c) did not require inclusion on the
air waybill of the "agreed stopping places," and stated that "the Courts of
all the countries should interpret this Convention in the same way."4
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the American and British courts construe the Con-
vention liberally, so as to make it practical and effective, in the areas of
cargo and baggage liability, and the cases indicate no great readiness on the
part of the courts to use a more technical point as a tool in arriving at a
desired result. In contrast, however, the very low Warsaw limitations of
liability for personal injury or death, by reason of public policy, have been
and will continue to be attacked by judicial interpretation (at least in the
United States), even where such action is premised upon a mere techni-
cality. In view of the success and strength of the domestic air transport
industry in the United States, where air carriers cannot hide behind an
artificial, Warsaw-type shield of limitation of liability for their torts, the
hardships inflicted on individuals and families by the Warsaw limitations
are unconscienable to the mind of this writer. So long as an unreasonable
limitation of carrier liability remains in Warsaw passenger cases (or per-
haps any limitation, for that matter), it is predictable that the courts of
the United States will continue their dual-standard approach of interpreta-
tion of the Convention in the areas of personal and property liability.
Consistency of interpretation may result only after all limitation of lia-
bility (e.g., recovery) is eliminated. It has been suggested that the risk of
liability be covered by insurance, as a regular operating expense of the
carriers. Most probably, no halfway point to this goal will ever remain
undisturbed.
Albert L. Holman
46 Note 44, supra, at 323.
' Note 22, supra, at 15.
48 Note 40, supra.
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